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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As of this writing, 252 people have been exonerated by means of DNA 
evidence,
1
 most leaving prison cells after many years in prison.  These 
exonerations represent only the ―tip of an iceberg‖2—the actual numbers of 
wrongly convicted people are undoubtedly much higher.
3
  The leading cause 
of wrongful convictions has been shown to be erroneous eyewitness 
identifications.
4
  Many studies of exonerations find that erroneous eyewitness 
identifications play a part in over 75% of all wrongful convictions.
5
  These 
studies have led to numerous proposals for the reform of police procedures,
6
 
yet we see surprisingly little progress toward minimizing eyewitness 
identification error, a major cause of failure in our criminal justice systems. 
In 1999, the Department of Justice‘s (DOJ) National Institute of Justice 
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1. See Innocence Project, http://innocenceproject.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (citing 252 
exonerations by means of DNA evidence as of April 18, 2010).  This does not include the hundreds 
of others exonerated by other means.  See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 
1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523–24 (2005) (reporting one study that 
examined 340 exonerations from 1989 to 2003, a little less than half of which were cleared by DNA 
evidence and the rest by other means).   
2. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 62 (2008); see also Sandra 
Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness 
Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2008) (arguing that ―untold numbers of 
additional innocent people have been punished for crimes they did not commit‖). 
3. See generally Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 
174–76 (2008) (addressing the rate of false convictions and some types of wrongful conviction 
cases). 
4. Thompson, supra note 2, at 1490 (citing studies of eyewitness testimony and wrongful 
convictions). 
5. Id. at 1490–91; see also Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Eyewitness 
Misidentification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2010). 
6. In an earlier essay, I compared the recommendations of the leading organizations that have 
conducted studies of eyewitness identifications.  See Sandra Guerra Thompson, What Price Justice? 
The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness Identification Reform, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 33 (2008).  
See also infra note 39 and accompanying text (listing reports that include proposed procedures for 
eyewitness identification). 
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published its influential study of eyewitness identification procedures that 
included detailed recommended guidelines.
7
  Following that effort, several 
other government and private task forces have followed suit and conducted 
additional independent studies, yielding similar proposals for reform.
8
  Over 
the past decade, it is fair to say that a growing consensus on state-of-the-art 
procedures for obtaining eyewitness identifications has emerged among 
reformers.
9
  Such procedures include techniques for reducing suggestion; for 
instance, having live lineups and photo arrays conducted by investigators who 
do not know the identity of the suspect, thus eliminating the possibility that 
the investigator might unconsciously influence the witness‘s selection or give 
the witness confirmatory feedback (e.g., ―Good, you picked the right guy.‖) 
that has been found to bolster a witness‘s confidence in the selection.10  Other 
recommendations pertain to how suspects are viewed, how witnesses are 
instructed, and how identification procedures are documented.
11
 
Reform groups have urged law enforcement to implement the 
recommended procedures voluntarily.
12
  Ten years after the Justice 
Department issued its report only a handful of states have adopted any 
reforms, whether as a matter of state constitutional law, evidentiary rules, or 
by statute.
13
  A handful of police departments have voluntarily implemented 
some of the critical reforms.
14
  Overall, the vast majority of the thousands of 
independent law enforcement agencies across the country have made few, if 
any, changes to the status quo.
15
 
 
7. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.   
8. Id. 
9. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 42–54. 
10. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1504–06; see also infra Part II.B. 
11. See infra Part II.B. 
12. Id. 
13. Only a few states have adopted more protective state constitutional or evidentiary rules.  
See, e.g., State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487, 492 (Utah 1986) (finding that trial courts should give a 
cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness identification in cases involving no corroborating 
evidence); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 591, 593–95 (Wis. 2005) (relying on ―extensive studies 
on the issue of identification‖ and citing Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines, as well as social 
science findings, in rejecting federal due process reliability assessment for show-ups and making 
show-ups necessary to comply with state due process requirements).  See also infra note 39 and 
accompanying text (citing reforms in North Carolina, New Jersey, and recommended procedures 
established in Wisconsin). 
14. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.   
15. I have previously argued that police departments are unlikely to adopt the suggested reform 
procedures on their own initiative.  See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1519–20.  At present, police 
departments apparently have not felt sufficient political pressure, or seen any other reason, to 
implement the changes of their own accord.  Indeed, in some cases, the suggested reforms have been 
met with intense resistance by law enforcement.  See SHERI H. MECKLENBURG, REPORT TO THE 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:  THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-
BLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, at iv (2006), available at http://www.chicagopolice.org/ 
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This Article presents the findings of an empirical study of recent case law 
in which defendants challenge the legality of eyewitness identification 
procedures.  The study involved a review of all cases within the calendar year 
beginning on April 8, 2008, and ending on April 8, 2009, in which state 
appellate courts issued opinions and in which the suggestiveness of 
eyewitness identification procedures were challenged.  In the cases surveyed, 
only a small percentage of the police investigations followed any of the 
recommended procedures and usually the most critical procedures were not 
followed.  The overwhelming majority of police departments in the cases 
surveyed followed the same suggestive procedures that have contributed to 
misidentifications and wrongful convictions in the past.
16
 
The study reported here examines only cases that met the following 
conditions: (1) eyewitness identification was an important issue; (2) 
defendants asserted their right to trial and challenged the identification at trial; 
and (3) defendants continued to challenge the identification evidence on 
appeal.  In a sense the cases examined here represent the most worrisome 
cases, those in which defendants have called upon the courts to correct 
perceived errors in the process.  However, this survey does not tell us much 
about the remaining universe of cases in which eyewitness identification plays 
a role.  It tells us nothing, for example, about the procedures actually followed 
in police departments throughout the country.
17
  Thus, we cannot draw any 
sweeping conclusions about overall police practices from this survey‘s small 
sample.  To obtain such information, one would have to conduct a massive 
survey of the tens of thousands of independent police agencies throughout the 
country.  What this survey does provide, however, is a glimpse at a relatively 
small number of cases in which defense lawyers have asserted mistaken 
eyewitness identification both at trial and on appeal.  Even this limited view is 
not encouraging. 
As this Article will demonstrate, many of the same problems and practices 
that have contributed to erroneous identifications in the past continue to 
present themselves in recently decided cases.  The reported appellate 
decisions often do not indicate whether other corroborating evidence of 
identification is present.  However, some courts make clear that an 
eyewitness‘s identification testimony was the sole basis for the conviction.18  
 
ILPilotonEyewitnessID.pdf; see also Thompson, supra note 6, at 47 (discussing the Illinois 
legislature‘s resistance to sequential lineups).   
16. See infra notes 89–97 and accompanying text. 
17. We can look to sources such as the Innocence Project which compile data on the states that 
have implemented reforms, but even that information tells us little about the procedures actually 
followed by police departments in most states.  See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g., Shabazz v. State, 667 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).  I have previously 
called for a requirement that eyewitness identification testimony be corroborated in all cases to 
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Given the lessons drawn from countless social science studies about the 
particular factors that reduce eyewitness accuracy and the police practices that 
inject suggestiveness, it is a safe bet that at least some of the defendants from 
the dozens of cases reviewed were wrongly convicted. 
How do appellate courts respond to the challenges to eyewitness 
identification evidence in these cases?  In this study, none of the courts invoke 
state constitutional law or evidentiary rules to reject the suggestive practices 
decried by reformers.
19
  The courts do not exclude eyewitness testimony, even 
when it is obtained under circumstances that have been shown scientifically to 
be error-prone, nor do they find such testimony insufficient to support a 
verdict without additional corroborating evidence.
20
  Indeed, many of the 
appellate opinions continue to view the eyewitness‘s degree of certainty as an 
indicator of reliability, despite the fact that social science research proves 
otherwise.
21
  Meanwhile, the courts often overlook other indicia of 
unreliability.  Just as in the days before the reforms were proposed, the study 
shows that dubious eyewitness identification evidence continues to be 
admitted, and appellate courts continue to turn a blind eye to defense 
challenges based on suggestiveness and unreliability of such evidence.  If one 
reads only the recent case law challenging suggestive identification procedures, 
one might get the impression that the innocence reform movement—and the 
exoneration of hundreds of innocent persons—never happened.22 
Part II of this Article provides a brief review of social science findings on 
eyewitness identifications, especially as they pertain to violent crimes 
perpetrated against strangers, and the reform procedures proposed by 
influential groups as a means of improving the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications.  These proposed reforms take into account social science 
research regarding both the weaknesses of eyewitness identification evidence 
and the effects of various police practices.  Part III presents the findings of an 
empirical study of state appellate case law and provides data regarding the 
 
prevent erroneous convictions.  See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1523–43.  Because no state has yet to 
implement such a corroborating evidence requirement, there are no such challenges to the lack of 
corroborating evidence.  I reiterate here that a rule that would have the effect of requiring 
investigators to gather evidence beyond eyewitness identification testimony would go a long way to 
decrease erroneous convictions based on misidentification.  Id. at 1523–28, 1540–43 (discussing 
trade-offs and feasibility of a corroboration rule).   
19. See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
20. Id. 
21. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
22. A study of cases involving exonerations showed that constitutional challenges to 
eyewitness identifications had been rejected in 100% of the cases, again indicating that such 
challenges have proved utterly useless in ferreting out erroneous identifications.  See Garrett, supra 
note 2, at 77.  Apparently, even a heightened awareness of wrongful convictions and the perils of 
eyewitness identifications have not caused most appellate courts to review identification claims more 
generously.  But see supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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types of crimes in which mistaken identification (and, thus, innocence) is the 
main defense.  The study examines the extent to which various factors are at 
play in these cases, such as the use of weapons, lighting conditions, the use of 
hats and disguises, and cross-racial identification.  It also provides data on the 
types of identification procedures used and the extent to which suggestive 
procedures are followed.  Part IV surveys the state appellate decisions in the 
study and demonstrates that state appellate courts typically ignore the well-
established scientific literature and the calls for procedural improvements. 
II.  THE FACTORS THAT PRODUCE UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
TESTIMONY AND THE REFORM PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO  
REMEDY THE PROBLEM 
After many decades of research, social scientists have amassed a wealth of 
literature proving definitively that certain variables reduce an eyewitness‘s 
ability to make an accurate identification of a stranger.
23
  Unfortunately, many 
of these variables, known as ―estimator variables,‖ are inherent in the 
fallibility of human beings as eyewitnesses and cannot be corrected by police 
procedure.
24
  For example, there is nothing the police can do to change the 
fact that robbery victims often view their culprits in the dark, for only a brief 
period of time, and while the robber is aiming a gun or knife at the victim, 
which induces great stress in victims and causes them to focus on the weapon.  
Each of these estimator variables has been shown to decrease the accuracy of 
an identification.
25
  Also, the police cannot correct the increased risk of 
misidentification created by the fact that a culprit and a victim are not of the 
same race or by the fact that robbers often wear hats, disguises, or have facial 
hair.
26
  Likewise, when witnesses are either very young or very old or have 
 
23. For a general overview of the scientific literature pertinent to variables that reduce the 
accuracy of eyewitness identifications in violent crimes, see Thompson, supra note 2, at 1497–1506. 
24. See Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and 
Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 765, 766 (1995).  See also Thompson, supra 
note 2, at 1501–04 (addressing estimator variables). 
25. The effects of poor lighting and limited time for viewing on the ability to identify a stranger 
are obvious.  See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 277, 280–82 (2003) (noting that the accuracy of an eyewitness‘s identification can be 
affected by many factors, including lighting conditions, amount of time the subject is viewed, 
whether the subject wears a disguise, lessened ability to recognize a person of a different race, and 
presence of a weapon, among others); ELIZABETH LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE & JENNIFER E. 
DYSART, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 16–36 (4th ed. 2007) (addressing lighting, 
violence, stress and fear, and weapon focus).  Scientific studies confirm the effects of ―weapon 
focus‖ and stress, both of which have been shown to reduce the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications.  See Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual 
Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 476 (2001); ELIZABETH F. 
LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 35–36 (1996). 
26. See Thompson supra note 2, at 1501 (on cross-racial identification); see also Wells & 
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used alcohol or controlled substances, studies have shown an increased risk of 
erroneous identification.
27
  It bears repeating that no police procedure can 
improve the inherent failings of a witness‘s ability to recall the face of a 
stranger observed under difficult circumstances. 
On the other hand, the police can greatly exacerbate the problem of 
inherently weak identifications by suggesting to the witness that a selection 
should be made or that the witness should choose a particular person.  Factors 
that contribute to an increased risk of error are known as ―system variables,‖28 
which refer to the variables that can be controlled by the system.  The 
following sections address the system variables that can contribute to 
identification error and the reform protocols designed to reduce those risks. 
A.  The Social Science of Eyewitness Identification—The System Variables 
With so many estimator variables present in violent crimes, it stands to 
reason that identification evidence in these kinds of cases will be particularly 
unreliable.  Thus, it is critical that the police follow procedures shown to 
produce the most accurate identifications possible. 
Experts consider as highly suggestive the single-suspect live viewings 
conducted near the time of the crime (so-called ―show-ups‖) because 
witnesses are likely to believe that the police have arrested the correct 
person.
29
  An eyewitness may wrongly assume that the police ―know‖ the 
displayed person is guilty, when, in fact, the police may not have any idea 
whether the person is the culprit.  If the suspect is shown in the back of a 
police car or wearing handcuffs, the situation further suggests to the witness 
that the police have caught the ―right guy.‖   
On the other hand, show-ups have some advantages.  The scientific 
literature confirms that delay in conducting an identification procedure will 
reduce reliability of the identification.
30
  Show-ups also allow the police to 
quickly clear individuals who may in fact be innocent.  Therefore, most courts 
adopt the position that, on balance, the benefits of a show-up outweigh the 
concerns about suggestiveness.
31
  However, researchers have found that show-
ups ―result in more false identifications than line-ups.‖32  In addition, show-
 
Olson, supra note 25, at 281. 
27. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 25, at 38 (studies show that children are ―relatively inaccurate‖ 
and also ―highly suggestible‖); Wells & Olson, supra note 25, at 280 (―very young children and the 
elderly perform[] significantly worse than younger adults‖ in studies of eyewitness identification); 
LOFTUS ET AL, supra note 25, at 46–50 (addressing effects of alcohol and other drugs). 
28. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 24, at 766. 
29. Behrman & Davey, supra note 25, at 477 (citing studies). 
30. Id. at 476.   
31. See infra notes 127–32 and accompanying text. 
32. Behrman & Davey, supra note 25, at 477. 
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ups, as well as single-photo identifications, create a secondary problem in that 
they taint subsequent pre-trial or in-court identifications by producing a higher 
level of confidence in the later identification.
33
 
Photo arrays or live lineups also can be conducted in a suggestive manner.  
For example, when asked to identify a culprit from a photo array or live 
lineup, eyewitnesses can be led to believe, or can erroneously assume, that the 
culprit is definitely among the persons presented.  In such cases, eyewitnesses 
are prone to employ a psychological process known as ―relative judgment‖ 
that causes them to choose the person who most closely resembles the 
culprit.
34
  Identifications under these circumstances tend to be reliable if the 
true culprit is actually in the lineup or photo array, but such identifications are 
highly inaccurate if the true culprit is not present.
35
  Thus, simultaneous 
presentation of individuals, together with statements indicating that the police 
believe they have arrested the right person, are two types of system variables 
that reduce the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.
36
  If the identification 
procedure is conducted by the investigating officer who knows the identity of 
the suspect, there is also a concern that the officer may consciously or 
unconsciously give an eyewitness clues about which person is the suspect.
37
  
Likewise, if the investigating officer gives an eyewitness confirmatory 
feedback (e.g., ―Good, you‘ve picked the right guy.‖), this feedback tends to 
inflate the witness‘s confidence in the accuracy of the identification and has 
other distorting effects on a witness‘s memory.38 
B.  The Reform Recommendations 
In the wake of numerous high-profile exonerations in the 1990s, various 
groups began to study scientific literature to determine what changes might be 
made to police procedure that would promote reliability in eyewitness 
identifications.  In 1999, the DOJ published a highly influential report on 
eyewitness identifications with proposed protocols and procedures 
recommended for further study.  Since then, several other respected groups 
such as the American Bar Association (ABA), private organizations, and 
several state agencies also have issued reports advocating improved 
procedures.
39
  These recommendations are based on findings in social science 
 
33. Id. at 488. 
34. See Thompson supra note 2, at 1505–06.  
35. Id. at 1506. 
36. Id. at 1504–06. 
37. Id. at 1504. 
38. Id. at 1505 (citing studies). 
39. See NAT‘L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE 
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; 
ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY, REPORT OF THE ABA 
646 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:639 
literature regarding witness memory as well as on considerations of effective 
police practice.
40
  The proposals focus mostly on two eyewitness 
identification procedures: live lineups and photo arrays.  The reports give 
much less attention to show-ups, which is unfortunate because show-ups 
constitute one of the most commonly used identification procedures.
41
 
The principle recommendations concern the procedures used to conduct 
the identification, as well as the proper documentation of the identification 
process.  For lineups and photo arrays, most of the proposals recommend what 
is known as ―blind,‖ or ―double-blind,‖ administration.42  In a blind 
identification procedure, the investigator conducting the lineup or photo array 
does not know the identity of the suspect.
43
  If the witness is also instructed 
that the investigator is unaware of the suspect‘s identity, that is called 
―double-blind.‖44  Using a double-blind procedure reduces suggestion in two 
 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION‘S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE 
CRIMINAL PROCESS (Paul Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) [hereinafter ABA INNOCENCE 
COMM. REPORT]; N.C. Actual Innocence Comm‘n, Recommendations for Eyewitness Identification, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/NC_Innocence_Commission_Identification.html; Letter from 
Office of Att‘y Gen., State of N.J., to All County Prosecutors, Col. Carson J. Dunbar, Jr., 
Superintendent, NJSP, All Police Chiefs, All Law Enforcement Chief Executives, Attorney General 
Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures (Apr. 18, 
2001), available at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/njguidelines.pdf 
[hereinafter N.J. Att‘y Gen. Identification Guidelines]; THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION: A POLICY REVIEW (2007), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/ 
national/solution/improving-eyewitness-id/; Innocence Project, Fix the System: Eyewitness 
Identification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Eyewitness-Identification.php (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Innocence Project, Fix Eyewitness Identification]; Innocence Project, 
Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Mistaken_ID_ 
FactSheet.pdf.  In the State of Wisconsin, the Attorney General adopted a ―Model Policy and 
Procedure for Eyewitness Identification.‖  WIS. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/ 
EyewitnessPublic.pdf (recommending ―double-blind, sequential photo arrays and lineups, . . . non-
biased instructions to eyewitnesses, and assessments of confidence immediately after 
identifications‖). 
40. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 60–61 (addressing the extent to which reports take into 
account practical considerations in recommending changes in police procedures).  
41. Id. at 53–54. 
42. The ABA, Innocence Project, North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission, the New 
Jersey guidelines, and the Justice Project all have called for blind procedures.  See Thompson, supra 
note 6, at 41.  Only the DOJ report is somewhat different; it tends to be more conservative in its 
conclusions and does not actually recommend the implementation of blind procedures.  See NAT‘L 
INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 9.  Even so, it notes that ―blind procedures . . . are used in 
science to prevent inadvertent contamination of research results, [but] may be impractical for some 
jurisdictions to implement.‖  Id.  It does recommend, however, that blind procedures should be an 
area of ―future exploration and field testing.‖  Id.  
43. See Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Improving 
Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 381, 389–90 (2006). 
44. Id. at 389. 
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ways: (1) it ensures that the investigator conducting the identification 
procedure cannot, either consciously or unconsciously, suggest which person 
the witness should select; and (2) it deters witnesses, again consciously or 
unconsciously, from looking to investigators for clues about whom to select.  
It also eliminates the opportunity for the officer to give the witness 
confirmatory feedback after the identification.
45
 
To combat the problem of relative judgment, whereby eyewitnesses tend 
to select the person who most closely resembles the culprit,
46
 researchers 
recommend that photos or live individuals be displayed in sequential fashion, 
rather than the traditional simultaneous fashion.
47
  The benefit of sequential 
presentation is that witnesses are less prone to select the wrong person.  The 
disadvantage, from the perspective of investigating officers, is that witnesses 
are also less prone to make any selection at all.
48
  As a result, the published 
reports yield a less enthusiastic verdict on the adoption of sequential lineups 
and photo arrays.  Private organizations, such as the Innocence Project and the 
Justice Project, have endorsed sequential presentation, while the ABA, DOJ, 
and the State of Illinois have endorsed field testing.
49
  Currently only two 
states, New Jersey and North Carolina, along with a few localities, mandate 
sequential presentation.
50
  Overall, the published reports agree that sequential 
procedures should be adopted, at least for purposes of field testing. 
Show-ups, one of the most common methods used to obtain eyewitness 
identifications, have received scant attention, even from the reform proposals.  
The DOJ report provides a number of important guidelines, such as separating 
witnesses during a show-up.
51
  The Innocence Project further recommends 
that show-ups occur in a neutral location and manner, and that the suspect be 
displayed without handcuffs (when practicable) and removed from the squad 
car.
52
 
For all identification methods, the proposals advocate proper 
documentation and the use of non-suggestive questioning from the beginning 
of an investigation through the identification process and thereafter.
53
  Also 
important is the use of cautionary instructions prior to the display of a suspect 
in a show-up, a photo array, or a lineup.
54
  In show-ups, witnesses should be 
 
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
46. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1505–06. 
47. Id. at 1519. 
48. Id.  
49. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 45–48. 
50. Id. at 46–47. 
51. Id. at 53. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 48–49, 52–53. 
54. Id. at 52. 
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told that the person displayed may not be the culprit.  In photo arrays or 
lineups, witnesses should be told that the suspect may or may not be present 
and, ideally, that the investigation will continue even if the witness makes no 
identification at that time.
55
  Finally, all of the proposals would require 
investigators to obtain and properly document a statement of the witness‘s 
confidence in selecting a suspect immediately after the identification is 
made.
56
  The proposed changes to police protocol would go a long way in 
reducing the negative effects that may occur through the police–witness 
interaction. 
Unfortunately, there appears to be little actual improvement in police 
practices.  Organizations like the Innocence Project keep track of jurisdictions 
that adopt improved eyewitness identification procedures.  It cites only two 
states and eight localities that have mandated sequential, double-blind 
procedures,
57
 which means that tens of thousands of police departments have 
yet to change their practices.  For example, in Texas, a state that has not 
adopted new procedures on a statewide basis, a recent news report found that, 
of the roughly two-dozen police departments in the Dallas area, only two even 
had written policies for show-ups.
58
  This is especially alarming given that 
Dallas has uncovered nineteen wrongful convictions in the past few years.
59
  
Even in the face of intense media scrutiny over the large number of 
exonerations in the Dallas area, the police departments in the region have not 
responded by implementing any new procedures for show-ups, a commonly 
used means of obtaining identifications.
60
  The use of show-ups in Dallas is 
 
55. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(b)(3) (2007) (requiring instructions to a witness 
that the investigation will continue even if the witness does not make an identification). 
56. Thompson, supra note 6, at 53.  Asking for a witness‘s confidence level at the time an 
identification is made reduces the common tendency for witnesses‘ confidence levels to rise as they 
progress through the investigative and trial process.  See John S. Shaw, III & Kimberley A. McClure, 
Repeated Postevent Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence , 20 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 629, 631, 647–48 (1996); see also infra notes 132–35, 142–44, and accompanying text 
(on effects of confirmatory feedback on witness confidence and jury instructions on witness 
confidence).   
57. See Innocence Project, Eyewitness Identification Reform, available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/165.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).  In addition, the State 
of Maryland, by a statute passed in 2007, requires police agencies to develop written policies on 
eyewitness identifications that must comply with DOJ standards.  MD. CODE ANN. § 3-506 (2008).  
The DOJ standards do not require blind and sequential lineups and photo arrays; however, the 
standards recommend them for further study.  NAT‘L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 8–9. 
58. Steve McGonigle & Jennifer Emily, Falling Prey to “Drive-By” Identification, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 13, 2008, at 1A, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/ 
dn/dnacases/stories/101308dnproDNAshowups.264c41d.html. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. (citing review of more than twenty years of appellate case law for the Dallas County 
area, and finding more than 100 felony convictions following trials that were based on show-ups).  
On the other hand, the Dallas Police Department has at long last implemented some improved 
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just one example; but there is every reason to believe that the same practices 
exist for police departments across the vast majority of the country.
61
 
III.  AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF STATE APPELLATE DECISIONS IN  
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION CASES 
One hypothesis to be drawn from the research on eyewitness 
identifications is that identifications made under the typical circumstances of a 
violent crime are likely to be less reliable.  Although many violent crimes are 
perpetrated between individuals who know each other,
62
 a substantial number 
of violent crimes are perpetrated between strangers.
63
  The typical scenario of 
these crimes displays factors that are known to reduce eyewitness 
identification reliability, such as use of a weapon, use of hats or disguises, 
poor lighting due to nighttime, and little time to view the suspect.  The 
element of cross-race identification can be present as well.  The findings of 
the study presented here answer two questions: (1) what types of crimes and 
circumstances are present among state appellate cases that raise eyewitness 
identification as a principle issue; and (2) what procedures were followed by 
the police in obtaining the identification evidence.  Of critical importance is 
whether the police procedures comport with the reform procedures as 
specified by the DOJ and other groups. 
In order to study appellate responses to identification evidence, I 
conducted a survey of all state appellate decisions handed down during the 
twelve-month period ending April 8, 2009, in which the introduction of 
eyewitness identification testimony was challenged.
64
  The research produced 
128 cases, of which 31 were excluded,
65
 leaving a total of 96 cases studied, 
 
techniques for photo lineups.  After a two-year delay, Dallas police began a study on blind, 
sequential photo lineups, apparently using a computer to obtain the fillers for the lineups.  See 
Posting of Jennifer Emily, Dallas Police Study into Sequential Blind Photo Lineups Will Begin Soon, 
Crime Blog (Oct. 16, 2008 07:01 EST), http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2008/10/dallas-
police-study-into-seque.html. 
61. See McGonigle & Emily, supra note 58. 
62. See MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION, 2008 (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf (addressing 
relationships between offenders and victims by gender, age, and types of crimes).  
63. For example, in 2008, 59% of victims of violent crime were related to or acquainted with 
their assailants, but 41% of victims were either assaulted by strangers or had an unknown 
relationship to their attackers.  Id. at 5 tbl.6. 
64. The survey was done via the Lexis search engine, searching all state court cases with the 
date restrictors of April 8, 2008 and April 8, 2009.  LexisNexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2010).  The search terms were ―‗eyewitness identification‘ & suggestive.‖  These 
terms were considered sufficiently broad to capture all cases involving constitutional challenges to 
eyewitness identification testimony. 
65. Cases were excluded for any of several reasons.  First, cases were excluded if the 
eyewitness and the suspect knew each other from a prior relationship, or if an eyewitness 
identification was not actually challenged on appeal.  When the witness has a prior relationship with 
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representing twenty-two states. 
The survey demonstrates a couple of important points about the types of 
crimes in which eyewitness identifications play a critical role today.  For 
instance, DNA evidence has essentially eliminated sexual assault cases from 
the mix of cases in which eyewitness identification testimony is critical.  Of 
the ninety-six cases under review, only four cases (about 4%) involved a 
sexual assault.  A recent study has shown that 100% of the cases in which 
individuals had been exonerated by means of DNA evidence involved sexual 
assault.
66
  Sexual assault cases in bygone days often relied solely on 
identification testimony to establish the identity of the perpetrator, and history 
has shown us that those eyewitnesses sometimes got it wrong.  Because DNA 
evidence is generally available in sexual assault cases, the police nowadays 
routinely use DNA evidence to exclude wrongly identified suspects and 
prevent miscarriages of justice in almost all of those cases. 
On the other hand, because DNA evidence is usually unavailable for most 
other crimes, the identification of culprits must still be made the old-fashioned 
way—through inherently unreliable eyewitness identification testimony.  Of 
the ninety-six cases in the survey, 51% involved facts that constitute 
robbery.
67
  Another 32.3% involved murder, attempted murder, or assault.  Of 
 
the suspect, the ―identification‖ is simply a formality, and there is no real doubt that the witness 
would mistakenly identify an innocent person.  Second, cases were excluded if the identifications 
were made prior to 1999, the year when the DOJ issued its influential report on eyewitness 
identification testimony.  Because one aspect of the study examined the extent of compliance with 
DOJ standards, the study could not include identifications made prior to 1999.  See NAT‘L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 39 (DOJ guideline on eyewitness evidence published in 1999).   Cases in which 
the identification was made without any police involvement were also excluded from the study.  In a 
few cases, the appeals presented no genuine issue relating to the eyewitness identification, so those 
cases were excluded as well.   
66. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1491 n.12. 
67. For purposes of the study, I have based the categorization of a case as involving ―robbery‖ 
or ―attempted robbery‖ if the facts involved a use of force or threat of force as a means of taking a 
person‘s property against their will, or the attempt to do so.  I did not base the category determination 
on the conviction charges, which can sometimes obscure the real gist of the crime involved.  For 
example, a ―carjacking‖ involves a use of force as a means of stealing a car and possibly other 
property.  A prosecutor could charge this as a ―burglary‖ in some states in which unlawfully entering 
a vehicle with intent to commit a felony can be considered burglary.  The use of a weapon in such a 
case could lead to an unlawful weapon possession charge.  It better serves our purposes to recognize 
that the facts fit the classic definition of robbery—a taking of property by means of force—better 
than they correspond with our traditional understanding of burglary as an unlawful entry into a 
habitation or as they fit a weapon possession charge, which tells us nothing about the violent nature 
of the crime.  It is important to call the set of facts ―robbery‖ because they belong to the category of 
cases that I argue is most likely to involve erroneous eyewitness identification testimony today.  The 
robbery cases also include one conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery.  In addition, in several 
cases, individuals were charged both with robbery and an assaultive offense such as kidnapping 
(n = 3), murder (n = 4), assault or attempted manslaughter (n = 4), or burglary (n = 3).  All of these 
cases are included only in the category designated ―Robbery/Attempted Robbery.‖ 
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the remaining cases, burglaries of homes made up 9.3%, thefts made up 2%, 
and false imprisonment accounted for 1% of the total.  In short, almost all the 
cases (88.5%) involved murders, robberies, sexual assaults, or false 
imprisonment—serious violent crimes.68  Interestingly, of the burglary/home-
invasion cases in the study, none involved the use of a weapon,
69
 even though 
burglaries are serious felonies with the potential for violence.  If we add 
burglaries to the calculus, then 97.9% of the cases in the study involved a 
serious violent crime.  All of the cases in the study included only stranger-on-
stranger crimes.
70
  In approximately 43% of the cases, lighting conditions 
were not optimal because the crimes were committed during nighttime 
hours.
71
  In addition, 65.7% of the cases involved the use of weapons (fifty 
firearms, eleven knives, and two blunt objects (a pipe and a golf club)).
72
 In 
11% of the cases, all of which were robberies, the culprits wore hats, had 
bandanas covering their noses and mouths, or had facial hair that obscured the 
features of their faces. 
 
68. See infra Table 1. 
69. One case in the study yielded convictions for both robbery and burglary.  See State v. 
Smith, Nos. 21463, 22334, Montgomery App. 2008-Ohio-6330 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2008).  In this 
case, the culprits forcibly entered a home specifically looking for one of the residents.  Id. at ¶ 3.  
Because the case can be viewed as one in which the culprits intended to confront the victims, it was 
grouped with the robbery cases and excluded from the burglary cases.  Id. 
70. Again, I eliminated all cases in which the witnesses had a prior relationship or otherwise 
knew the identity of the culprit.  See supra note 65. 
71. For purposes of this study, ―night‖ is defined as an offense committed between the hours of 
9:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. or designated as having been committed at ―night,‖ ―after dark,‖ or ―during 
nighttime.‖  Offenses committed indoors, regardless of time of day, were excluded, as were offenses 
committed during ―evening.‖  In addition, in twenty-one cases neither the time of day nor the lighting 
conditions were mentioned, so these were excluded for purposes of calculating the percentage of 
cases occurring at night.  
72. See infra Table 2. 
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Table 1. Offenses Represented in Case Study 
Offense Number Percentage 
Robbery/Attempted Robbery 49 51.0 
Murder/Attempted Murder/Assault 31 32.3 
Burglary/Home-Invasion 9 9.3 
Sexual Assault 4 4.2 
Theft 2 2.1 
False Imprisonment 1 1.0 
Table 2. Use of Weapons 
Weapon Number Percentage 
Firearm 50 52.1 
Knife 11 11.5 
Physical Assault, No Weapon 6 6.2 
Blunt Object 2 2.1 
Threat of Weapon, No Weapon 2 2.1 
No Weapon 23 24.0 
No Mention of Weapon 2 2.1 
From this data, we can determine that numerous estimator variables, which 
decrease eyewitness identification accuracy, are at play in a substantial majority 
of the cases studied.  The well-documented effect of weapon-focus plays a role 
in a majority (65.7%) of this group of cases.  Poor lighting occurred in a 
substantial percentage (43%) of the cases.  The use of hats, bandanas across the 
nose and mouth, facial hair, and other disguises applies in a smaller percentage 
of the cases (11%), but these are all robberies, which also generally involve use 
of weapons and other estimator variables.  Finally, at least 88% of the cases 
involve serious violent crimes, which will generally involve high levels of 
stress, another known factor for decreasing the accuracy of identifications.
73
 
Cross-racial identification is also an accuracy-decreasing factor.
74
  With 
few exceptions,
75
 it was not possible to determine from the appellate decisions 
whether the witnesses and culprits were of different races because the races of 
the individuals often were not mentioned.
76
 
 
73. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 25, at 29. 
74. Cross-race identifications are less reliable than same-race identifications.  See Thompson, 
supra note 2, at 1501. 
75. See, e.g., People v. Figueroa, No. B199625, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3529, at *5 
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2008); Howell v. State, 989 So. 2d 372 (¶ 23) (Miss. 2008). 
76. The issue is sometimes incidentally mentioned in challenges to lower courts‘ refusals to 
admit expert testimony explaining that cross-race identifications are less reliable.  See, e.g., People v. 
Nazario, No. 3415/2006, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5350, at *1, 5–6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 30, 2008). 
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Finally, witnesses often view criminal culprits when the witnesses are not 
in a good physical condition to form an accurate memory of a culprit‘s face.  
For example, in the cases studied, there was an eleven-year-old witness to a 
murder,
77
 an elderly victim of a knife-point robbery,
78
 a witness who was 
drinking beer at the time of the crime and on painkillers when he identified 
the defendant,
79
 and another witness who may have been smoking 
marijuana.
80
  One witness of a knife-point robbery viewed a robber who wore 
a plastic nose and fake glasses,
81
 while the victim of another robbery had been 
brutally beaten and left unconscious during the robbery.
82
  One victim had 
been shot multiple times,
83
 and another had a gun pressed to his head when he 
saw the culprit for a few seconds.
84
  One sexual assault victim saw her 
attacker, while being sodomized, as the tape on her eyes came off and she 
peered through a gap in the pillowcase the attacker had put over her head.
85
 
While any one of these estimator variables makes the identification less 
likely to be accurate, this study demonstrates that, in violent crime cases such as 
the vast majority of cases in this study, numerous estimator variables often are 
present.  To provide one of many possible examples, in Howell v. State, the 
witness viewed a murder committed with a firearm, a highly stressful event to 
observe.
86
  The witness saw the killing in low light of the early morning and 
from about seventy-one feet away.
87
  It was a cross-race identification, and the 
witness may have been smoking marijuana at the time.
88
 
The study sheds light on the mix of identification procedures used by 
police departments in recently decided cases challenging identification 
 
77. People v. Romero, 892 N.E.2d 1122, 1124–25 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).  For a discussion of the 
effects of age on the accuracy of eyewitness identification, see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
78. People v. Johnson, No. A118080, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5376, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
July 1, 2008) (victim was eighty-six years old); State v. Ayo, 2008-468, 2008-1179, p. 4 (La. App. 
5 Cir. 3/24/09), 7 So. 3d 85, 90 (eighty-eight-year-old victim); see also supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. 
79. People v. Martinez, No. H03185, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7997, at *2, 5–6 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 26, 2008). 
80. Howell, 989 So. 2d (¶¶ 21–22).  
81. People v. Sanchez, No. C057286, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10334, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Dec. 22, 2008). 
82. State v. Williams, 960 A.2d 805, 808 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
83. State v. Battle, No. 2007AP1059-CR, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 301, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Apr. 22, 2008). 
84. Hudson v. State, No. 14-07-00888-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 499, at *1–2 (Tex. App. 
Jan. 29, 2009). 
85. State v. Scarborough, No. E-2007-01856-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 
191, at *4–6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2009). 
86. Howell v. State, 989 So. 2d 372 (¶¶ 21–23) (Miss. 2008). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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evidence.  As mentioned earlier, we cannot extrapolate from these figures and 
determine the mix of procedures followed throughout the country, but the 
study does provide insights into the procedures followed in cases where 
innocence was claimed based on a misidentification. 
Scientific research shows that a witness‘s first viewing of a suspect is 
critical because it affects the witness‘s memory of the event.89  In the case 
study reported here, photo arrays, also known as photo lineups or ―6 Packs,‖ 
were the first procedure followed in obtaining the identifications in fifty-eight 
cases (60.4%).
90
  Show-ups were the first procedure in twenty-two (22.9%) of 
the cases.  In two of the cases, the witnesses were shown single photos of the 
suspects (followed by photo lineups).
91
  In another three cases, live lineups 
were used first.  In two cases, the witnesses viewed mug shots at the police 
station first.
92
 
In three cases, the witnesses identified the suspects not by recollection of 
their facial features, but by things like their ears or their shirts.
93
  In two cases, 
witnesses identified suspects by their tattoos.
94
  In other cases, the witnesses 
identified the defendants in whole or in part by hearing their voices.
95
  
Surveillance video was available in several cases, but in only one case did 
witnesses first identify the suspect from the video.
96
  In another case, the 
witness spotted the suspect in public, without police intervention, and this 
 
89. LOFTUS, supra note 25, at 106–08. 
90. See infra Table 3. 
91. See People v. Noriega, No. B188098, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10061, at *38 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2008); State v. Allen, 274 S.W.3d 514, 519 (Mo. App. 2008). 
92. See infra Table 3. 
93. In one of the photo lineup cases, the witness identified the defendant from a photo lineup 
based mostly on his ears.  She also had provided a description of the suspect, including height and 
race, that varied considerably from the defendant‘s characteristics and she did not mention that the 
defendant had a missing tooth.  See People v. Rucker, No. 280082, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 2236, at 
*1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2008).  In yet another photo lineup case, the victim did not see the 
defendant‘s face during the assault but identified him based on his build and on his statement that the 
victims had ―told on him,‖ which the victims believed referred to an earlier incident involving the 
defendant in a grocery store.  See People v. Bryant, No. A114925, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
3154, at *2–6 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2008).  In one of the show-up cases, the witness could not see 
the culprit‘s face but identified a man police caught in the area by his shirt, build, race, and age.  See 
People v. Evans, No. H029616, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8541, at *4–5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 
2008). 
94. In Scarborough, a rape victim worked with a police sketch artist to develop a composite 
sketch of a tattoo, followed by her out-of-court viewing of photos of the suspect‘s tattoos.  State v. 
Scarborough, No. E-2007-01856-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 191, at *7 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2009).  In Commonwealth v. Crork, the witness was shown a single photo of the 
suspect‘s tattoo.  966 A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). 
95. People v. Nelson, Nos. B195996, B205753, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *4–5 
(Cal. Ct. App. June 2, 2008); State v. Williams, 960 A.2d 805, 809–12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2008). 
96. See Tucker v. State, 965 A.2d 900, 902 (Md. 2009). 
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identification was followed by a show-up.
97
 
Table 3. Types of Identification Procedures 
Identification Procedure Number Percentage 
Photo Lineup 58 60.4 
Show-Ups 22 22.9 
Identified Physical Attribute Other than Face 
(Tattoo, Voice) 
3 3.1 
Live Lineup 3 3.1 
Single Photo 2 2.1 
Viewed Mug Shots 2 2.1 
No Police Involvement or No Information on 
Procedure 
2 2.1 
In-Court Identification 1 1 
Viewed Surveillance Video 1 1 
This group of cases presents a large number of estimator variables that 
decrease identification accuracy; the next question is how often police 
investigators followed the protocols recommended for reducing 
suggestiveness.  The study did not include cases in which photo arrays or live 
lineups were conducted via the double-blind or sequential method, which is 
advanced in the reform proposals.  In a few of the cases (6.2%), police 
officers read admonitions (usually that the culprit may or may not be in the 
show-up or photo array) to witnesses before they viewed a suspect in a show-
up or photo array.  This suggests that in some jurisdictions admonitions have 
been introduced as standard procedure.  In none of the cases, however, did the 
admonition include an assurance that the investigation would continue even if 
the witness failed to identify anyone at that time, as suggested in some reform 
proposals.
98
 
In a larger number of cases, police officers used practices that can 
decrease identification accuracy.  For example, in thirteen cases (13.5%) 
police officers told witnesses that a suspect had been arrested or taken into 
custody, a practice that suggests to a witness that the police have other 
evidence to prove the suspect is guilty.
99
  A key procedure recommended for 
cases involving multiple witnesses is that they should be kept apart during an 
identification procedure and should be instructed not to discuss their 
identification with other witnesses;
100
 however, witnesses were kept together 
 
97. See People v. Romero, 892 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
98. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
99. See NAT‘L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 31–33. 
100. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 53. 
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during identification procedures in ten (10.4%) cases.
101
  In four cases (4.2%), 
the police gave confirmatory feedback after the identification was made, 
which has been shown to boost a witness‘s confidence level and taint the later 
in-court identification process.
102
 
Table 4. Use of Suggestive Procedures 
Suggestive Procedure Number Percentage 
Witness Told Suspect in Custody 13 13.5% 
Witnesses Viewed Suspect Together 10 10.4% 
Police Gave Confirmatory Feedback 4 4.2% 
Social science also warns that showing the photo of a suspect in more than 
one photo array may cause ―unconscious transference.‖103  There are several 
cases in this study in which the police showed a witness the defendant‘s photo 
in more than one photo array and the witness was unable to select the 
defendant‘s photo, but the witness was nonetheless able to identify the 
defendant at a preliminary hearing or at trial.
104
  In these cases the witnesses 
did not identify the defendants on the first try, but were able to do so on a 
second attempt.  The concern is that a witness may have unconsciously 
transferred the image of the defendant‘s face from the photo array and then 
erroneously believed that the image was part of the memory of the crime.  
Sometimes this unconscious transference can occur through no fault of the 
 
101. In an additional case, one witness told a second witness that she had identified the 
defendant in the show-up, despite being told by police not to talk to the other witness.  The second 
witness then confidently identified the defendant, although she said that the culprit wore a different 
outfit.  People v. Nelson, Nos. B195996, B205753, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *5 (Cal. 
Ct. App. June 2, 2008). 
102. See supra Part II.A.  In one of the cases, the witness stated that the confirmatory feedback 
made her ―feel better.‖  See Shabazz v. State, 667 S.E.2d 414, 417 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
103. See LOFTUS, supra note 25, at 142–44; LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 25, at 106–08. 
104. People v. Ybarra, No. F047855, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 1421, at *21–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Sept. 12, 2008) (witness viewed two photo arrays that were identical, with the exception that they 
featured two different photographs of the defendant in the same place on the array); People v. 
Richardson, No. B197177, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5741, at *4–5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 
2008) (witnesses were shown two photo arrays and twice gave equivocal responses, but reported 
being 100% sure after seeing the defendant at a preliminary hearing); State v. Zabala, No. 97875, 
2008 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 534, at *2–3 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2008) (two show-ups of the 
defendant given to the same witnesses within minutes of each other, with the second show-up after 
the officer discovered in the defendant‘s backpack clothing matching the original description of the 
suspect); People v. Hart, No. 272910, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 850, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 
2008) (witness viewed surveillance tape and was unable to select the defendant from a photo array, 
but identified the defendant at trial after the court the denied defendant‘s request to sit in a spectator 
section to force the witness to choose from among a group of spectators); State v. Lee, 
No. 2007AP1636-CR, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 546, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App. July 16, 2008) (witness 
unable to identify the defendant from a photo lineup, but later identified him at trial). 
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police,
105
 but in other cases police practices can create the potential for the 
problem to occur. 
IV.  JUDICIAL TOLERANCE OF SUGGESTIVE IDENTIFICATION PRACTICES 
It is nearly impossible to determine whether there are any wrongful 
convictions among the dozens of cases in this study.  A few cases raise 
serious concerns due to the presence of multiple estimator variables that 
reduce accuracy, the use of suggestive police procedures, and the absence of 
corroborating evidence.  Due to the nature of the encounters in so many of the 
cases involving robbery or assaults with firearms, there is generally no 
possibility of obtaining DNA evidence from the crime scenes.
106
  Thus, these 
prosecutions hinge on eyewitness identification of culprits observed under 
conditions most likely to lead to misidentification.  Are all of the individuals 
in the study actually guilty?  Juries were willing to find that they were.
107
  The 
fact that some of these cases could have resulted in convictions ―beyond a 
reasonable doubt‖ is highly troubling.  Without strong corroborating 
identification evidence, the law should not permit convictions based on 
eyewitness identification.
108
  At a minimum, the law should not continue to 
allow the introduction of eyewitness identifications obtained by the police 
using procedures that, as indicated by scientific research, create an increased 
risk of error in identification. 
The study presented here examined appellate court reaction in cases 
involving serious challenges to eyewitness identification testimony.  The 
findings are quite sobering.  Of the ninety-six cases studied, only two resulted 
in reversals, and in both cases the error was based on something other than the 
eyewitness identification evidence.
109
  In State v. Washington, for example, a 
 
105. In one case, the defendant claimed that he had been in the store as an innocent bystander 
during the armed robbery and that the witnesses erroneously remembered him as the robber instead.  
People v. Robinson, No. 276889, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 743, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2008).  
If true, this would be a classic form of unconscious transference. 
106. See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 530–31. 
107. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE 
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 207–09 (1995) (summarizing survey studies, prediction 
studies, and mock juror studies, and concluding that ―jurors are generally insensitive to factors that 
influence eyewitness identification accuracy, often rely on factors (such as recall of peripheral 
details) that are not diagnostic of witness accuracy, and rely heavily on one factor, eyewitness 
confidence, that possesses only modest value as an indicator of witness accuracy‖).   
108. See generally Thompson, supra note 2 (arguing in favor of a corroborating evidence 
requirement for admission of eyewitness identification testimony); see also Noah Clements, Flipping 
a Coin: A Solution for the Inherent Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 40 IND. L. 
REV. 271, 272, 290 (2007) (proposing a blanket exclusion of eyewitness identification testimony in 
criminal cases). 
109. A third case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the identification testimony.  See 
State v. Chipi, No. A-6156-05T4, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 304, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
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North Carolina court of appeals reversed a conviction based on an 
unnecessary and unreasonable delay of nearly five years and its effects on 
witness memory.
110
  In one other case, a Michigan appellate court upheld the 
exclusion of a pre-trial identification (on Fourth Amendment grounds) but 
then affirmed the admission of in-court identifications by the same 
witnesses.
111
  Thus, in only one case was there a total preclusion of 
identification testimony, and that was based on a violation of the defendant‘s 
speedy trial right.
112
  In every other case, the eyewitnesses were permitted to 
provide eyewitness identification testimony in some form. 
A.  Claims of Unduly Suggestive Procedures and Unreliability 
The United States Supreme Court has fashioned a due process 
exclusionary remedy for unduly suggestive identification procedures; 
however, even an unduly suggestive identification need not be excluded if it is 
determined to be sufficiently reliable.
113
  The federal standard for determining 
reliability calls on courts to take into account five factors in evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances: 
[T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the 
time of the crime, the witness‘ degree of attention, the 
accuracy of the witness‘ prior description of the criminal, the 
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and 
 
Div. Sept. 22, 2008). 
110. 665 S.E.2d 799, 812 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).  The defendant‘s primary claim was that the 
avoidable delay by the prosecution caused the eyewitnesses‘ memories to fade, creating a serious risk 
of misidentification.  Id. at 811–12; see also People v. Earle, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 266–67 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2009).  In Earle, the trial court refused to sever an indecent exposure case supported by strong 
evidence from a sexual assault case in which the eyewitness‘s description of the attacker differed 
greatly from the defendant‘s actual appearance.  Id. at 266.  The victim in each case also gave 
different descriptions of her respective assailant‘s vehicle.  Id.  Additionally, the sexual assualt victim 
had managed to break loose from her attacker, but the defendant was a world-class competitor in the 
sport of ―submission grappling.‖  Id.  For these reasons, the appeals court found that there was 
―fertile ground for a reasonable doubt in jurors‘ minds that the victim had correctly identified 
defendant as her assailant.‖  Id.  The joinder of the less serious indecent exposure case, for which 
there was strong evidence, thus ―played a central role, and quite possibly a decisive one, in securing a 
conviction on the assault charge.‖  Id. at 267. 
111. See People v. Leonard, No. 270638, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1110, at *1, 41–43 (Mich. 
Ct. App. May 27, 2008).  The Supreme Court has permitted the admission of in-court identification 
testimony, even if the pre-trial identification testimony is excluded, if there is a finding that the in-
court identification is based on an independent recollection of the events and is not the product of the 
tainted identification procedure.  See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).   
112. Washington, 665 S.E.2d at 812. 
113. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 
(1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385–86 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 
294, 299 (1967). 
2009] JUDICIAL BLINDNESS 659 
the confrontation.
114
 
This five-factor test, fashioned in 1972, has been roundly criticized for 
including witness certainty as a factor when social science research shows that 
witness confidence in an identification does not necessarily correlate with 
accuracy, and that a witness‘s confidence level has a tendency to rise as the 
witness moves through the criminal justice process.
115
  Nonetheless, state 
appellate courts, with few exceptions, continue to apply this test (including 
the witness confidence prong) in assessing federal and state due process 
claims.
116
  Courts seem unfamiliar with, or unpersuaded by, the scientific 
research on witness confidence, and they erroneously rely on witness certainty 
in evaluating the reliability of the identification.
117
 
In addition, the Supreme Court‘s decisions focus solely on police conduct 
in determining whether the identification process was ―unduly suggestive,‖ 
which is the basis for a due process claim.
118
  Thus, cases in which suggestion 
is introduced by a private citizen or in which identifications are simply 
unreliable due to the presence of multiple estimator variables—through no 
fault of the police—do not raise a due process issue.119 
These cases raise a variety of claims relating to eyewitness identification.  
In many cases, defendants challenge the identification testimony on due 
process grounds, claiming that the procedures used to obtain the identification 
were unduly suggestive and that the resulting identification is unreliable.
120
  
 
114. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200. 
115. See Shaw & McClure, supra note 56, at 629–30; see generally Timothy P. O‘Toole & 
Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process 
Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 120–22 (2006) (calling 
for an updated rule in part because witness confidence levels are not necessarily strongly correlated 
with accuracy and can be infected by suggestion). 
116. See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
117. See, e.g., People v. Gandara, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4780, at *17–18 n.3 (Cal. Ct. 
App. June 12, 2008) (identification was reliable in part because the witness ―did not have any doubts 
when she picked out Gandara‘s photograph‖ over a year after the crime). 
118. The U.S. Supreme Court has only decided cases in which identification procedures were 
conducted by the police and has not considered suggestive procedures employed by private parties.  
In Manson v. Brathwaite, for example, the Court framed the question as follows: ―[W]hether the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the exclusion, in a state criminal trial, apart 
from any consideration of reliability, of pretrial identification evidence obtained by a police 
procedure that was both suggestive and unnecessary.‖  432 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added).   But see 
State v. Chen, 952 A.2d 1094, 1105–06 (holding that New Jersey evidence rules require that courts 
grant ―a preliminary hearing when the reliability of State‘s identification evidence is called into 
question by evidence of highly suggestive words or conduct by private actors that pose a significant 
risk of misidentification‖). 
119. See, e.g., People v. Richards, No. F054916, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9262, at *15–
16 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2008) (noting that no authority exists for the proposition that conduct by 
private citizens can be the basis for a motion to exclude identification testimony).  
120. See infra notes 122, 127 and accompanying text. 
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Sometimes, misidentification claims are incorporated into claims of 
ineffectiveness of counsel when purported counsel errors relate to eyewitness 
identification evidence.
121
 
One type of due process claim centers on the makeup of a photographic 
lineup or live lineup.  Defendants argue that these lineups are unduly 
suggestive either because the defendant is the only person in the group who 
fits the witness‘s description or because the defendant‘s photo is said to ―stand 
out.‖122  Courts generally reject these claims and find that the other persons in 
the lineup are sufficiently similar to the defendant in appearance, and, thus, 
the lineup is not unduly suggestive.
123
  This is the case even if the defendant‘s 
photo is the only one with a different color background or is a different size 
than the rest,
124
 because courts focus instead only on the similarity of features 
of the individuals in the photos; sometimes even the dissimilarity of the 
individuals‘ features is not considered important.  In People v. Lloyd, for 
example, the court rejected such a claim despite the fact that both witnesses 
stated that the people in most of the photos either did not match the 
description or were too old to be the culprit.
125
  The Lloyd court concluded 
that, despite the fact that individuals in up to four of the six photos ―may have 
looked too old, thereby eliminating them from consideration by the 
eyewitnesses, [that] does not mean that the witnesses were thereby forced to 
misidentify [the] defendant.‖126 
Several other cases challenged the suggestiveness of show-ups.  In 
People v. Acosta, the appellate court rejected the defendant‘s challenge to the 
use of a show-up.
127
  The defendant cited the U.S. Department of Justice 
Guide and a California Department of Justice District Attorney‘s Association 
Field Guide for the proposition that field show-ups are ―automatically 
 
121. See, e.g., Richards, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9262, at *3–4; State v. Lyons, 
No. 90604, 2008-Ohio-5099, ¶ 11 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2008); State v. Taylor, No. 90001, 2008-
Ohio-3455, ¶ 89 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008). 
122. See, e.g., People v. Rutledge, No. A117967, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5995 (Cal. Ct. 
App. July 24, 2008) (defendant was the only person in the lineup with braids); People v. Romero, 
892 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (defendant was the only person in the photo array with a 
teardrop tattoo). 
123. See, e.g., People v. Styles, No. F054133, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 195, at *14 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2009); People v. Bolden, No. G038374, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10253, at 
*9–20 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008); Rutledge, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5995, at *11–12; 
People v. Richardson, No. B197177, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5741, at *20 (Cal. Ct. App. July 
16, 2008); People v. Acosta, No. E042057, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3929, at *13–15 (Cal. Ct. 
App. May 14, 2008); Romero, 892 N.E.2d at 1128–30; State v. Blackburn, No. W2007-00061-CCA-
R3-CD, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 439, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2008). 
124. See, e.g., Richardson, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5741, at *19–20. 
125. No. 277172, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 2196, at *7–8 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2008). 
126. Id. at *8–9. 
127. No. E045031, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 906, at *1, 10 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2009). 
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suggestive.‖128  The court relied on precedent in rejecting the contention that a 
show-up should be considered automatically suggestive and instead applied 
the same five factors of the federal due process test.
129
  Interestingly, the court 
rejected the contention that the show-up was suggestive despite two facts 
indicating otherwise: (1) it was a single-person field show-up; and (2) the 
police told the witness that the defendant was the person they had arrested.
130
  
The court stated that telling the witness that the police had arrested the suspect 
―was not particularly suggestive, as most people asked to make an 
identification at a show-up would probably assume that a person detained by 
police as a suspect is probably under arrest.‖131  This conclusion flies in the 
face of social science literature and common sense.  It is precisely because 
people will assume that the police believe that a person displayed in a one-
person show-up is guilty that the use of show-ups is suggestive.
132
  If an 
officer confirms a person‘s belief that the police have enough evidence to 
arrest the person, the problem of suggestiveness is only exacerbated. 
Appellate courts also seem to misunderstand the dangers of confirmatory 
feedback, leading them to reject claims on the grounds that the feedback, 
given after the identification is made, does not render the selection process 
suggestive.
133
  Contrary to courts‘ position, scientific studies indicate that the 
danger of such feedback is that it can vastly elevate the confidence level that a 
witness will later report from the level that the witness actually experienced at 
the time of the selection.
134
  Thus, the problem with confirmatory feedback is 
not that it renders the identification process ―suggestive,‖ but that it creates a 
tendency to bolster a witness‘s perception of his or her true level of 
confidence.  Thus, the witness later will overstate his or her certainty in the 
identification, when the true level of confidence might have been much lower 
without the confirmatory feedback.  Of course, there is still the problem that 
witness confidence statements, with or without confirmatory feedback, are 
notoriously unreliable anyway.
135
 
Even when defendants cite to reform proposals and ask courts to require 
 
128. Id. at *7. 
129. Id. at *6–7.  The court cited the California Supreme Court decision that adopted the 
federal test.  Id. (reiterating the test from People v. Cunningham, 25 P.3d 519 (Cal. 2001)). 
130. Acosta, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 906, at *7–8. 
131. Id. at *8. 
132. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
133. See, e.g., People v. Gandara, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4780, at *15–16 (Cal. Ct. 
App. June 12, 2008) (confirmatory feedback was given after the witness‘s unaided identification of 
the defendant, therefore, the feedback did not taint the pretrial identification nor did it invalidate the 
in-court identification); State v. Smith, 946 A.2d 319, 325 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (same); State v. 
Allen, 274 S.W.3d 514, 525 (Mo. App. 2008) (same). 
134. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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the police to follow less suggestive procedures, the courts decline to impose 
such requirements on the police as a matter of either evidentiary or 
constitutional law.
136
  Instead, the courts simply follow the five-factor test in 
Manson v. Brathwaite,
137
 including the scientifically invalid witness 
confidence prong.
138
 
B.  Claims Challenging Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification or 
Decisions to Exclude Expert Testimony 
Two areas left within the discretion of the trial court are the issuance of 
jury instructions and the admission of expert testimony.  Appellate courts 
usually reject challenges to the exclusion of expert witness testimony on 
eyewitness identifications.  Sometimes, the claims are rejected on the basis 
that there was sufficient corroborating identification evidence.
139
  Other times, 
the appellate courts find that the decision is a matter within the trial court‘s 
discretion, that jury instructions and the argument of counsel suffice to alert 
the jury about the issues with eyewitness identification testimony, or that the 
jury is sufficiently able to evaluate the testimony without the assistance of an 
 
136. See, e.g., Smith, 946 A.2d at 327 (concluding without explanation that ―[d]ue process does 
not require the suppression of a photographic identification that is not the product of a double-blind, 
sequential procedure‖); Gibson v. State, 661 S.E.2d 850, 854 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (failure to read 
admonition form did not render a lineup procedure impermissibly suggestive); Allen, 274 S.W.3d at 
525 (rejecting the claim that police should use blind administration of lineups and make a written 
record of a witness‘s responses at the moment of identification because not required by state law); 
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 663 S.E.2d 536, 539 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting the need for a 
sequential, double-blind photo lineup).  But see People v. Bryant, No. A114925, 2008 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 3154, at *13–14 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2008) (defense attorney was not prevented 
from asking an expert witness about the DOJ‘s position on double-blind, sequential photo lineups). 
137. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, No. B197177, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5741, at 
*16–17 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2008); People v. Juarez, No. B197785, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 5273, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2008); Gandara, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4780, at 
*14; People v. McGuire, No. F051892, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4108, at *7–8 (Cal. Ct. App. 
May 20, 2008); State v. Gwennap, Nos. 98,254, 98,255, 2008 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 622, at *15–
16 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2008) (adding an additional factor); State v. Zabala, No. 97875, 2008 
Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 534, at *11–12 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2008); State v. Hall, 43,125, pp. 7–
8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08), 986 So. 2d 863, 869; People v. Thomas, No. 272731, 2008 Mich. App. 
LEXIS 1221 (Mich. Ct. App. June 12, 2008); People v. Robinson, No. 276889, 2008 Mich. App. 
LEXIS 743, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2008); Howell v. State, 989 So. 2d 372 (¶¶ 21–23) (Miss. 
2008); State v. Lyons, No. 90604, 2008-Ohio-5099, ¶ 17 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2008); State v. 
Taylor, No. 90001, 2008-Ohio-3455, ¶ 94 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008); State v. Segines, 
No. 89915, 2008-Ohio-2041 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 2008); State v. Lee, No. 2007AP1636-CR, 2008 
Wisc. App. LEXIS 546, at *9 (Wis. Ct. App. July 16, 2008). 
138. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
139. See, e.g., People v. Olague, No. C053372, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2754, at *97 
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009); People v. Bolden, No. G038374, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10253, 
at *22 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008); People v. Lloyd, No. 277172, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 2196, at 
*7–8 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2008); People v. Smith, 869 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
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expert (and presumably without any assistance at all).
140
  Indeed, in some 
cases the courts even have shown hostility toward the idea of admitting expert 
testimony on the science of eyewitness identification.
141
 
Not only is witness confidence erroneously considered in the due process 
reliability test, courts in some jurisdictions compound the error by also 
instructing juries to consider it in evaluating the reliability of identification 
testimony.  Many cases in the study challenge the use of this jury instruction.  
In People v. Nelson, for example, a California court of appeals upheld the use 
of this standard jury instruction that instructs jurors to consider ―the extent to 
which the witness is either certain or uncertain of the identification.‖142  
Further, a due process challenge to the use of this instruction was rejected in 
People v. Ruiz, despite the fact that the court agreed that ―there may be little 
correlation between a witness‘s certainty and reliability of the 
identification.‖143  Defendants sometimes also seek reversal because trial 
courts have refused to give cautionary jury instructions on police suggestion 
in the eyewitness identification process.
144
 
 
140. See, e.g., People v. Fowlkes, No. B198406, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6971, at *22 
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) (permitting the expert to offer his opinion would have improperly 
allowed the judge and jury to shift responsibility for the decision to the witness); State v. Allen, 274 
S.W.3d 514, 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (exclusion may be based on a theory that jurors can ―‗rely on 
their own experience to reach a judgment on what weight to give eyewitness evidence‘‖) (internal 
citation omitted).   
141. In Bolden, for example, the trial court rejected the admission of expert testimony, 
according to the appellate court, on the ground that ―Shomer [the expert witness] ‗seemed like an 
advocate‘ and had overstated the importance of certain factors.‖  2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
10253, at *14–15; People v. Ruiz, No. E044016, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8960, at *18 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2008) (referring to scientific findings on witness certainty as ―certain experts‘ 
opinions that have not yet achieved widespread acceptance in California jurisprudence‖).  
142. Nos. B195996, B205753, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2, 
2008), at *9–10; see also Gwennap, 2008 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 622, at *16–17 (not error to 
instruct on witness certainty as a factor lending reliability to identification); People v. Canfield, 
No. A118126, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9289, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2008); People v. 
Luna, No. G039202, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9001, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2008); 
Juarez, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5273, at *7; People v. Rodriguez, 387 Ill. App. 3d 812, 820 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
143. 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8960, at *16.  In Ruiz, the court rejected the due process 
challenge to the instruction despite the fact that experts have stated that witness confidence does not 
correlate with accuracy.  Id. at *15–16.  The court concluded that to find a due process violation 
―would essentially be binding the jury to accept certain experts‘ opinions that have not yet achieved 
widespread acceptance in California jurisprudence.‖  Id. at *18.  The court also found no error in the 
―alleged ‗contradiction‘ between defendant‘s expert testimony and the trial court‘s jury instruction.‖  
Id. at *19. 
144. People v. Wells, No. B200441, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7859, at *10–11, 15–16 
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008) (affirming the trial court‘s refusal to instruct the jury to consider 
whether ―police exercised coercion or deception or suggestion in the identification process‖ and, if 
so, ―whether or not it was of such a nature as to be reasonably likely to produce a misidentification‖); 
People v. Deo, Nos. C047126, C046880, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4822, at *12–13 (Cal. Ct. 
664 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:639 
Even if identification evidence was erroneously admitted or expert 
testimony erroneously excluded, the conviction will not be reversed when 
there is sufficient corroborating evidence of identification (and, thus, less risk 
of misidentification).
145
  Thus, corroborating evidence of identification plays a 
role at the back end of the process, but it is not a requirement for admission of 
identification testimony.
146
 
The Nelson case raises so many troubling issues that it justifies a closer 
look.  First, it is a prime candidate for scientifically sound jury instructions on 
the limited relevance of witness confidence in evaluating identification 
reliability.  In Nelson, the defendant was convicted of committing two similar 
robberies of the same fast-food restaurant.
147
  There was no corroborating 
evidence of identification
148
 and, other than the eyewitness‘s identification 
testimony, other critical facts indeed tended to exonerate the suspect.  For 
example, the robber had worn a black sweatshirt with a white shirttail hanging 
out from underneath, but the defendant was arrested in a nearby park soon 
after the robbery wearing a ―blue or purple shirt.‖149  According to the court, 
―[o]ne of the deputies testified that criminals commonly wear multiple layers 
of clothing during crimes, so that they can avoid detection afterwards by 
shedding a layer of clothing.‖150  There are at least three problems with this 
theory: (1) the robber had worn the same black sweatshirt in the two robberies 
for which Nelson was tried, which is not consistent with the ―shedding a 
layer‖ idea; (2) the robber wore the same clothes to the same restaurant on 
two occasions, suggesting that this was not a particularly calculating robber; 
and (3) the layer of clothing under the black sweatshirt was white, but 
 
App. June 13, 2008) (affirming the trial court‘s refusal to instruct the jury to be cautious in 
considering eyewitness identifications). 
145. People v. Olague, No. C053372, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2754, at *97 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Apr. 7, 2009); People v. Bolden, No. G038374, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10253, at *18–
19 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008). 
146. See generally Thompson, supra note 2 (arguing in favor of a corroboration requirement 
for admission of eyewitness identification testimony). 
147. Nelson, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *1. 
148. The robber‘s face was not clear on surveillance videos of the two robberies, and no 
fingerprints were found on the knife found on the ground near an alley.  Id. at *5 n.2, 6. 
149. Id. at *4.  It is not uncommon for suspects not to match witness descriptions.  See, e.g., 
People v. Earle, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (victim characterized the assailant as 
looking Mexican and skinny, but the defendant clearly looked northern European and had an athletic 
build with a bull neck; the defendant also had a deeply furrowed brow and protruding, possibly 
damaged ears, which the victim did not mention); People v. Fowlkes, No. B198406, 2008 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 6971, at *4–5, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) (appellant had a shaved head, but the 
shooter had ―hair on his head‖ and the appellant appeared to have lighter skin than he did on the day 
of the shooting; victim also described the car as a white two-door Dodge Neon with a green emblem 
on the back, but the co-defendant drove a white, four-door Honda Civic with no green sign or 
emblem on the back). 
150. Nelson, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *6. 
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defendant was found wearing a blue or purple shirt.
151
  In addition, the police 
officers found a small amount of currency on the ground near the knife that 
was recovered, but they did not recover the black sweatshirt or the white shirt 
worn underneath.
152
 
Moreover, the police could not account for the other money stolen in the 
second robbery, moments before Nelson‘s arrest.153  He was found with only a 
small amount of money on him when arrested.
154
  A deputy testified that 
criminals commonly attempt to avoid detection by disposing of loot after a 
robbery.
155
  However the defendant would not have had time to spend the 
money, and it makes little sense to think he would throw the stolen money 
away on the off chance that he might be arrested. 
In addition, even the identification testimony was not particularly solid.  
First, all the identifications were cross-racial, which are scientifically shown 
to be less reliable.
156
  Scientific findings indicate that such identifications are 
less accurate even if the witness harbors no significant biases and has had 
frequent interactions with persons of that race.
157
  Yet at trial, one witness was 
allowed to testify that she had ―friends and coworkers who were African-
American, and could distinguish between different people of that race.‖158  
The second witness also testified to a professed ability to distinguish people of 
different races.
159
 
The witnesses also did not inspire confidence in their true ability to 
recognize the culprit.  At trial, the victim of the first robbery, Mr. Hernandez, 
said he did not get a good look at the robber‘s face.160  He could not give a 
positive identification of Mr. Nelson, but he was nonetheless allowed to 
testify that the defendant looked ―‗familiar‘‖ to him.161  After the second 
robbery, Ms. Martinez, who had viewed both robberies, testified that she was 
―positive‖ that the defendant was the robber; however, she had shown less 
confidence when she identified him just after the second robbery.
162
  Ms. 
Martinez viewed the defendant in a show-up at which he was illuminated with 
bright lights, without handcuffs, and not wearing a black sweatshirt as the 
 
151. Id. at *3–6. 
152. Id. at *4. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at *6. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at *3–6. 
157. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1501. 
158. Nelson, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4472, at *3. 
159. Id. at *6. 
160. Id. at *3. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
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robber had worn.
163
  She said that she recognized the defendant‘s face 
(because his clothes were different) but wanted to be sure, so she asked to 
hear his voice.
164
  Only after he spoke the words, ―Open the register,‖ did she 
identify him.
165
  Ms. Martinez said she then was ―a hundred percent sure that 
it was him.‖166  However, social science research on voice identification 
shows that attempts to recognize an unfamiliar voice, based on minimal 
interaction under stressful circumstances, are highly unreliable, and yet 
witnesses will exhibit high confidence in their abilities to make such 
identifications.
167
 
Ms. Martinez then told the second witness, Ms. Diaz, that she had 
identified the defendant, despite being told not to do so by the police.
168
  In 
this way, she tainted Ms. Diaz‘s identification.  Ms. Diaz then stated that she 
could identify the defendant by his face even though he was wearing ―‗a 
whole different . . . outfit.‘‖169  When this witness viewed Mr. Nelson, he was 
wearing handcuffs.
170
  She also stated that she was positive that he was the 
robber, relying on her recollection of his face.
171
   
Ms. Diaz‘s identification is tainted by several suggestive facts: (1) the 
defendant was the only person shown to the witness by the police; (2) the 
previous witness told the second witness that she had identified the defendant; 
and (3) the defendant was shown to the witness while the defendant was 
wearing handcuffs and having bright lights shined on him.
172
  Given that the 
first witness had already identified Mr. Nelson as the robber, there was no 
need for a second show-up.  Presumably, the police could have organized a 
live lineup for the second witness instead. 
Again, it is impossible to know from reading the appellate case law 
whether someone like Mr. Nelson is actually guilty or not.  The jury found 
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the sole basis of eyewitness 
testimony, which rested in large part on voice identification by the principal 
witness.
173
  Mr. Nelson is serving a fourteen-year prison sentence.
174
  His 
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appeal challenged the admission of the eyewitness testimony on several 
grounds, including the use of a jury instruction that told jurors to take into 
account witness confidence in determining the reliability of the testimony.
175
  
Ideally, the instruction would instead warn jurors not to give weight to 
witness confidence.  In reviewing Mr. Nelson‘s challenge to the use of the 
jury instruction on witness confidence, the lower appellate court simply 
deferred to the California Supreme Court‘s approval of the instruction and 
found ―no impropriety‖ in the use of the witness confidence factor listed in 
the standard jury instruction.
176
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The innocence movement, armed with DNA evidence, has led to the 
release of hundreds of people who had been wrongly convicted.
177
  Influential 
groups have reacted by devoting a great deal of study to arrive at scientifically 
supported recommendations for preventing future miscarriages of justice.
178
  
Having marked the ten-year anniversary of the DOJ‘s Guidelines for 
Eyewitness Identifications, it behooves us to evaluate the implementation 
stage of the innocence reform movement.  Unfortunately, the improved 
procedures have not been widely mandated through the political process.
179
  A 
paltry number of jurisdictions have adopted the recommended procedures—
only two states and a handful of local law enforcement agencies have adopted 
the key procedures recommended for eyewitness identifications, such as 
sequential, double-blind administration of lineups and photo arrays.
180
  Can 
we rely on the police departments themselves to adopt the changes?  In this 
country, there are almost 19,000 independent police departments,
181
 and there 
are no widely followed professional accreditation standards that might impose 
the recommended procedures as a condition for accreditation.
182
  The failure 
of the political process to mandate such changes has left virtually all law 
enforcement agencies in forty-seven states free to ignore the scientific 
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findings and recommendations for change, and that would appear to be 
precisely what they have done.  The same, faulty eyewitness identification 
practices of the past that produced hundreds of erroneous convictions continue 
to be used today. 
The study presented in this Article has shown that in a large number of 
robbery, murder, and assault cases there continue to be grave concerns about 
eyewitness misidentification of innocent defendants.  Unfortunately, DNA 
evidence is not available in most robbery or murder cases, so any innocent 
persons who are wrongly identified are not likely to be exonerated in the 
fashion of those wrongly convicted of sexual assaults in the past.  Is there any 
reason to believe that eyewitness-victims in sexual assault cases are more 
prone to err in identification than eyewitness-victims in robbery or homicide 
cases?  In a word: No.  There is no reason to think robbery victims make for 
better eyewitnesses than sexual assault victims.
183
  Indeed, misidentifications 
in robberies most likely occur at a greater rate than in rapes because 
―robberies are frequently quick, and may involve less immediate physical 
contact,‖184 making an accurate identification less likely.  Thus, the number of 
wrongly convicted persons undoubtedly is many times greater than the 
number of exonerated individuals.
185
 
We may never have the means to detect the scores of innocent people who 
have been wrongly arrested for robberies, murders, and other violent crimes 
due to erroneous eyewitness identification.  However, at a minimum, courts 
can refuse to apply scientifically unsound due process tests and jury 
instructions, and they can admit expert testimony to educate the jurors of the 
pitfalls of the identification process.  Courts can also cite the failure to follow 
state-of-the-art practices and note the estimator variables at play in a 
particular case (like use of a weapon or disguise) as part of the ―totality of the 
circumstances‖ in deciding state due process claims.186  Instead, the study 
reported here shows a disappointing failure of state appellate courts to show 
leadership in ensuring greater accuracy in the criminal justice system. 
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